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Out of Sync: Section 8 and
Technological Advancement in
Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Susan Magotiaux*

I. INTRODUCTION
Canadian legislation on police powers in the criminal sphere have
recently been “updated” and the Supreme Court of Canada has
considered and pronounced on conflicts of privacy and investigation in a
digital context. But are we doing enough to adapt to the changing context
or are we out of sync?
This article offers a review of recent Supreme Court of Canada
search and seizure cases to demonstrate the awkward ongoing waltz of
old law and new technology. In 2013-2014, the Supreme Court decided
R. v. Vu,1 R. v. TELUS Communications Co.,2 R. v. Spencer3 and R. v.
Fearon;4 four cases addressing the parameters of section 8 of the Charter5
in the context of computers, digital communications, Internet subscriber
information and mobile phones, respectively. In each case the Court was
forced to confront the ill-matched partnership between technology and
legal principle. Is a computer a thing? Are texts like conversations?
When is a phone like a computer? When is a computer like a filing
cabinet? Can we claim anonymity online? The carefully crafted answers
are meaningful, but the time lag between actual technological
developments and consideration of the limits of police powers in using
those advancements hampers law enforcement and leaves rights-holders
suspicious and uncertain. It’s an ill-fated marriage; law and technology.
*
Counsel, Crown Law Office Criminal, Ministry of the Attorney General for Ontario. The
views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.
1
[2013] S.C.J. No. 60, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 657, 2013 SCC 60 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Vu”].
2
[2013] S.C.J. No. 16, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 3, 2013 SCC 16 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “TELUS”].
3
[2014] S.C.J. No. 43, [2014] S.C.R. 212, 2014 SCC 43 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Spencer”].
4
[2014] S.C.J. No. 77, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, 2014 SCC 77 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Fearon”].
5
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
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One is the result of researched, reasoned, incremental progress, the other
a dash of innovation and experiment. No wonder we can’t keep up.
Police seeking guidance are met with confusion. Section 8 of the
Charter protects citizens from unreasonable search and seizure. Since
Hunter v. Southam6 in 1984, the starting place for a constitutional search
is pre-authorization. Technology challenges our ability to plan ahead. For
computer searches, officers increasingly don’t know where evidence will
be, in what form, or how it may be accessed. Data cannot always be
seized, brought back and examined later. Leaving aside the technical
question of how things can be seized, the “what” and “why” of privacy
determinations are also moving targets. Figuring out what will be
reasonable, on a normative appreciation of privacy, is a daunting task not
well suited to frontline investigatory work.
The potential for the commission and facilitation of crime online, and
the amplified impact and permanence of harm done to some victims of
crime cannot be forgotten in the dialogue. Safety, security and the
suppression of crime are legitimate countervailing concerns. As succinctly
put by Binnie J. in R. v. Tessling, the community wants privacy but it also
insists on protection.7 The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly rooted
privacy decisions in the values and reasonable expectations of Canadians,
not in the technical fine-points of a given intrusion.8 The focus is and
should remain on what we are willing to give up in the ground between
privacy and law enforcement objectives, not on what tools will we use to
carve the dividing line in any given case. Section 8 jurisprudence has
developed with a lens wide enough to encompass the changing tides of
technology.9

II. SECTION 8 AND “NEW” TECHNOLOGY IN THE SUPREME COURT
Police powers get tested against the section 8 standard in the
courtroom. As social behaviour changes and lives are lived increasingly
online or leaving traceable digital breadcrumbs, it is of course logical
that investigation of crime will engage more and more technological
tools and digital landscapes. Police will capture digital evidence,
6

Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, 2004 SCC 67, at para. 17
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Tessling”].
8
Id., at paras. 29-30; R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, at 43-44
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Wong”].
9
Wong, id., at 44.
7
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prosecutors will bring cases of cybercrime and judges will be called upon
to draw reasonable boundaries in an uncertain field.
The struggle to understand new technology and apply legal
principles is not new. The fundamental and normative principles of
privacy that guide Canadian courts can and do adapt to brave new
worlds. Vu, Fearon and Spencer offer some salient examples of practical
application of traditional search principles in the technological age. They
offer warnings too. Both must be heeded if we are to successfully
navigate these uncharted waters.
1. Is it a Bird? Is it a Plane?
There is nothing new about approaching new information by trying
to fit it into existing paradigms. Start with what you know. But in many
cases, technology shifts too far for analogy to past experience to be
instructive. For computers and other digital devices, attempts to
analogize to more traditional tangibles have recently been curtailed.
In Vu, Cromwell J., writing for the Supreme Court of Canada,
conclusively settled the debate; computers are not like filing cabinets.
They are not like briefcases, and cannot be approached in the same
fashion in applying section 8 analysis and determining where the
individual’s right to be left alone is drawn. A warrant can authorize a
search through whatever cupboards and closets may contain the items to
be seized, but it cannot authorize dumping the digital drawers of a
computer without explicit reference. Justice Cromwell noted that
computers differ in important ways from the receptacles we have
considered under the traditional section 8 framework and computer
searches give rise to unique privacy concerns that are not adequately
addressed by the “old” approach.10 Post-Vu, police must obtain specific
pre-authorization to search a computer.11
The discarding of analogies to non-digital receptacles was an
important and necessary step in bringing search law up to date. Not just
because of the sheer amount of information potentially accessible to
authorities on a personal computer, but, as explored in Vu, because the
nature of digital information and evidence is of different quality in ways
10

Vu, supra, note 1, at para. 2.
Vu does leave room for the unanticipated find; a device found when executing a warrant
can be seized for preservation and a fresh authorization sought to particularly address the
authorization for computer search, Vu, supra, note 1, at para. 49.
11
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that matter in the privacy debate. Unlike in cupboards and desks, digital
data is created without conscious action or even knowledge of the user
and may remain, in recoverable form, when the user tries to destroy it.
The individual control over personal information is reduced in digital
data, and control over information is a key component to informational
privacy.12
In Fearon, Cromwell J., again writing for the Court, maintained the
consistent message that digital devices require a fresh approach. Cell
phones and other mobile communications devices, like the computers
considered in Vu, cannot be understood for section 8 purposes as the
equivalent of briefcases and purses.13 Again, the Court emphasized the
nature and scope of the information potentially (though not inevitably)
accessible to law enforcement through the digital device and found that
the new technologies required a new and specific restraint of police
power.
The Fearon majority made the important point that courts should
avoid crafting different tests for the different capabilities of individual
technological devices.14 Examination or search of computers and
smartphones does not inherently or inevitably result in a vast invasion of
personal privacy. The device itself may not contain intimate details, and,
significantly, police can be constrained in examination. As demonstrated
in Fearon, it is possible to add safeguards to the exercise of police power
to ensure section 8 compliance. The majority imposed measures to limit
the potential privacy intrusion by modifying the common law search
incident to arrest power and rejected the “all or nothing” approach.
2. R. v. Spencer  A New Normative
Section 8 cases struggle with the balance between individual
intrusions and law enforcement objectives. Finding the line is an exercise
in value interpretation. The broader context complicates our sense of
normal. The world has changed rapidly. That is hardly a new sentiment.15
But in the specific realm of public accessibility of personal information,
the daily lives of young Canadians display a seismic shift from former
12

Vu, supra, note 1, at para. 24. See also paras. 40-44.
Fearon, supra, note 4, at para. 51.
14
Fearon, supra, note 4, at para. 52.
15
See discussion of public fear at the introduction of the threatening new technology of
Kodak in 1902 in Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, “A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy and
Shifting Social Norms” (2013) 16 Yale J.L. & Tech 59, at 72.
13
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generations. Classrooms have twitter feeds, pre-teens have YouTube
channels, and images of our families, our pets, our food, our fashion, our
failures and our friends are posted or transmitted in ever-growing circles,
out of our control. Emotions are expressed with emoticons. Relationships
bloom, grow and wither with no in-person contact; love at first site, first
byte. Businesses gather and collate our mass digital dalliances to predict
our preferences and provide us with better more individualized products
and services.16 That’s “normal”.
There is and absolutely should be a high standard for state access to
the personal pieces we wish to guard, but courts, or rather judges, who
may not be personally entrenched in the digital norm of today’s youth,
cannot be expected to measure with precision the social temperature on
privacy. We want privacy but we want publicity too. We overshare but
might later wish for over-protection, though it is well-accepted that the
Charter does not protect want we want to be kept confidential, only what
we can reasonably expect to keep private.17
In Tessling, Binnie J., for the Court, remarked that “a person can
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in what he or she knowingly
exposes to the public, or to a section of the public, or abandons in a
public place”.18 In the “public” spaces of online activity, the line is no
longer as clear.
In Spencer, the Court addressed file-sharing over public paths and
the scope of police power to put a subscriber’s name and address to a
publicly broadcast Internet Protocol (“IP”) address.
Spencer’s actual finding was of limited scope; police must now
obtain prior judicial authorization to access basic subscriber information
from an Internet Service Provider (“ISP”). The discussion around how
courts approach and should approach privacy dialogue in a digital age
was far-reaching. Privacy is a normative concept. It must be considered
anew in each context. Courts assessing privacy interests must consider
not only what we actually believe is confidential or protected, but also
what we want to be private.19 The social values of Canadian society
weigh heavily in the mix. Social values, of course, change and conflict.

16
Tene & Polonetsky provide a review of various corporate attempts at data analysis and
tailored marketing and service-delivery and the mixed consumer response to use of data.
17
Tessling, supra, note 7, at para. 26.
18
Id., at para. 40.
19
Spencer, supra, note 3, at para. 18; Tessling, supra, note 7, at para. 42; R. v. Patrick,
[2009] S.C.J. No. 17, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 579, 2009 SCC 17, at para. 14 (S.C.C.).
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In Spencer, the Supreme Court of Canada explored an emerging
concept in the privacy debate; a right to anonymity. 20 Spencer broke new
ground in search law by defining informational privacy as comprised of
three elements: secrecy, control and anonymity.21 The concept of
anonymity was “not novel” but the application to the Internet context and
the suggestion of a right to anonymity in the online world is an extension
of uncertain ambit. The Court acknowledged the concern that overextension of online anonymity protection could impede the investigation
of Internet crime, but responded that “recognizing that there may be a
privacy interest in anonymity depending on the circumstances falls short
of recognizing any ‘right’ to anonymity and does not threaten the
effectiveness of law enforcement in relation to offences committed on the
Internet”.22 While a totality of circumstances test can never offer precise
predictability, it is questionable how police will translate such nuanced
analysis into frontline decisions about the scope of their powers.
3. The Third Party Problem
In traditional search analysis, when evidence was found in shoe
boxes and file cabinets, courts could analyze assertions of privacy by
reference to such (non-exhaustive) factors as ownership and the ability to
exercise control over a space or to exclude people.23 Now we cannot
exclude the third parties from our information, though many could,
practically speaking, exclude us. A web-based e-mail service may choose
to preserve what the user would prefer to erase.24 A company, within the
bounds of privacy legislation and court orders, sets policy on when and
how it will provide data to police, and the contracts imposed on users
ultimately come to factor into the decision on what we expected and
could reasonably expect to remain private. Spencer demonstrated the
20

The concept of a right to Internet anonymity was earlier developed in a very similar
context by Doherty J.A. writing for the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Ward, [2012] O.J. No. 4587,
2012 ONCA 660, 112 O.R. (3d) 321, at paras. 70-75 (Ont. C.A.). Justice Doherty’s analysis was
cited with approval in Spencer, supra, note 3, at para. 48.
21
Spencer, supra, note 3, at para. 4.
22
Id., at para. 49.
23
R. v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128, at para. 45 (S.C.C.). Of course,
the Supreme Court has adapted the framework for questions of informational privacy and applied
analysis to developing technologies and computer contexts: R. v. Plant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 97, [1993]
3 S.C.R. 281, at 45 (S.C.C.); Tessling, supra, note 7, at para. 32; R. v. Cole, [2012] S.C.J. No. 53,
[2012] 3 S.C.R. 34, 2012 SCC 53, at paras. 39-58 (S.C.C.).
24
See discussion of TELUS, below.
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difficult decision as to how to weigh contractual terms in the privacy
balance.25 While the Court in Spencer found that there is “no doubt” that
contractual and statutory schemes play an important role in the
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis, their weight in the balance is
uncertain.26
Our lack of control over digital information in the hands of third
parties is a social problem beyond the criminal arena. Permanence of past
slips is a pressing global concern. The Court of Justice of the European
Union issued a ground-breaking judgment in May 2014, finding that a
person had a “right to be forgotten” and that an Internet search engine
had a legal obligation to act on personal requests to remove links to
historical information that was accurate when posted but is irrelevant,
inadequate or excessive in light of passage of time.27 The decision has
sparked international conversation and debate about the ability to
regulate the Internet and exercise control over information in the public
domain.28 Freedom of expression clashes with freedom from the
permanent links of history, but it is Google that must balance the
interests of the individual requester and the public interest in access to
information. No one is quite sure where privacy interests lay, or how they
change with age.
4. Passwords and Protocols
The Supreme Court has effectively (and wisely) avoided pushing
judges too far into the forensic technology world at the stage of judicial
pre-authorization for anticipated search and seizure. In Vu, the Court
25
Spencer, supra, note 3, at paras. 52-60. See also R. v. Gomboc, [2010] S.C.J. No. 55,
[2010] 3 S.C.R. 211, 2010 SCC 55 (S.C.C.).
26
Spencer, supra, note 3, at para. 54.
27
Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD)
and Mario Costeja González, OJ C 165, 9.6.2012, Case C-131/12, Court of Justice, May 13, 2014.
See also Google’s Report on implementation of the judgment “The Advisory Council to Google on
the Right to be Forgotten”, February 6, 2015, accessed April 3, 2015 online: <https://www.google.com/
advisorycouncil/>.
28
See for example: Katie Engelhart, “The right to be forgotten online: Will it ruin the
Internet?”, MacLean’s, November 10, 2014, accessed April 2, 2015 online: <http://www.macleans.ca/
news/world/the-right-to-be-forgotten-online-will-it-ruin-the-internet/>; François LeBel & Mandy
Woodland, “The Right to be Forgotten”, Privacy Pages, October 2014 – CBA National Privacy and
Access Law Section Newsletter, accessed April 1, 2015 online: <http://www.cba.org/CBA/
sections_privacy/newsletters2014/forgotten.aspx.>; and Andre Mayer, “‘Right to be forgotten’: How
Canada could adopt similar law for online privacy”, June 16, 2014, accessed April 3, 2015 online:
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/right-to-be-forgotten-how-canada-could-adopt-similar-law-foronline-privacy-1.2676880>.
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considered and rejected a proposal that all computer searches be preauthorized with a specific examination protocol.29 Although judicial
officers retain the discretion to impose conditions in any warrant to
search, extending the obligation to require advance approval of the
detailed manner of search would be impractical, if not impossible, and is
not required to ensure constitutionality of a computer search. The Court
recognized that technological advancement leads to uncertainty in
predicting the investigative tools that may be required to meet law
enforcement objectives in a given case. Evidence cannot be found in
discrete “places” on a device, and all manner of methods may be used to
“hide” evidence. Without knowing in advance how devices or technology
has been used, police cannot rationally set plans for forensic
examination, and judicial officers cannot be expected to meaningfully
evaluate any such technical strategy.
Search protocols may be possible in the right case, and may be
imposed under the discretionary powers of an issuing justice. Although
finding that protocols were not constitutionally required, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that Parliament could take action in delineating
standard conditions, and that police could, where appropriate in the
circumstances, return to a justice post execution to seek a second
authorization with clarified terms or limits reflective of the preliminary
discovery and informed assessment of necessary tools and examination.30
The Court allowed for room to grow into our technological
understanding. For now, in most cases of computer seizure, it is highly
unlikely that police could set out with any kind of useful precision the
exact pathways and plans for a digital examination. Any current forensic
strategies may well be obsolete between drafting and application given
the speed and permutations of technological advancement.
Protocols were approached with caution in Vu and passwords were
similarly sidelined as the arbiters of privacy in Fearon, where the
Supreme Court dialled back the technical distinction that had gained
traction in lower courts.31 The Fearon Court dismissed an argument that
the presence or absence of a password should be definitive in the privacy
analysis. Again, it was a practical approach. It is dangerous to ascribe
legal meaning to an ill-understood feature of some devices, some of the
time. In the cases before Fearon, the password problem had been a
29
30
31

Vu, supra, note 1, at paras. 53-62.
Vu, supra, note 1, at paras. 56 and 62.
Fearon, supra, note 4, at para. 53.
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dividing line. The Court of Appeal in Fearon prompted headlines with a
finding that the cursory mobile phone search conducted incident to arrest
would not have been permitted had the phone been password-protected.32
In Nova Scotia, the Court of Appeal took a different view, finding that
that “because a password is not on at the very moment the police seize a
cell phone cannot mean that the state is welcome and free to roam
through its contents”.33 Fearon avoided ascribing prominence to the
presence or activation of a particular feature  it was but one fairly
insignificant factor in the totality of circumstances establishing an
expectation of privacy. Though, as a matter of practice, technological
features such as passwords or encryption can frustrate the exercise of
police powers regardless of where the legal debate lands.

III. TECHNOLOGY AND THE CRIMINAL CODE SEARCH POWERS
Search law in Canada has a rich history of back and forth between
courts and Parliament. Cases are pursued through provincial courts, the
Supreme Court decides an issue, and Parliament responds with
amendments to the search provisions to address a constitutional
shortcoming or gap.34 It has happened with consent wiretaps,35 video
surveillance warrants,36 tracking warrants37 and emergency wiretaps.38
32
R. v. Fearon, [2013] O.J. No. 704, 2013 ONCA 106, 114 O.R. (3d) 81, at paras. 73-75
(Ont. C.A.); “OK for police to search cellphone if no password, says court”, February 21, 2013,
CBC News, online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/ok-for-police-to-search-cellphone-ifno-password-says-court-1.1310260>.
33
R. v. Hiscoe, [2013] N.S.J. No. 188, 2013 NSCA 48, 328 N.S.R. (2d) 381, at para. 81
(N.S.C.A.).
34
For a historical look at Parliament’s Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter
“Criminal Code”] responses to Supreme Court of Canada cases on s. 8, see Michal Fairburn,
“Twenty-Five Years in Search of a Reasonable Approach” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 55 [hereinafter
“Fairburn”].
35
The 1990 decision in R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Duarte”] was followed by s. 184.2 [as am. S.C. 1993, c. 40, s. 4] of the Criminal Code,
supra, note 34, governing interception of communications where one party has consented.
36
Wong, supra, note 8, decided the same year as Duarte, id., led to the enactment of video
surveillance provisions located in a general search warrant section (487.01) but importing the
protections of Part VI wiretap authorizations, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, the Crown
Liability and Proceedings Act and the Radiocommunications Act, S.C. 1993, c. 40, s. 15.
37
After the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Wise, [1992] S.C.J. No. 16, [1992]
1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.), regarding the privacy intrusion on a beeper used to track a vehicle, Parliament
added s. 492.1 [as am. S.C. 1993, c. 40, s. 18] of the Criminal Code, supra, note 34, to specifically
authorize the use of tracking devices.
38
After R. v. Tse, [2012] S.C.J. No. 16, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 531, 2012 SCC 16 (S.C.C.),
Parliament enacted amendments to Part VI to require both notice and reporting on emergency
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But the glacial pace of a case’s progression on the plodding wheels of
justice to the pinnacle, followed by a run through the law-making mill, is
an obviously poor pathway for response to rapid advancement of
technology. The resulting Criminal Code is a patchwork of isolated
responses to specific search problems, rather than a contemplated and
cohesive whole.39 At its very foundation, the Code embodies concepts
that are losing their relevance in a digital age.
1. Traditional Warrants and Authorization
The bedrock of police search powers in the Criminal Code is the
search warrant. Found in section 487, it is the original and generalized
vehicle for judicial pre-authorization of state intrusion into the sphere of
personal privacy. When the necessary grounds are made out, a justice
may authorize the seizure of things that may afford evidence of an
offence from a specific named place. Things in places. That bedrock may
have faults.
Is a computer a thing? Is the data on it a thing? Is the string of binary
code sent through satellites in pieces and reassembled at some other
machine a thing? Is it the same “thing” when it lands as it is when it
travels in pieces? And what of the places? Police can’t knock and
announce their presence at the door of satellites and clouds and mobile
servers. Yet without particularity of place, current tools may be
unavailable.
The search provisions in the Criminal Code have been updated to
address the lack of tangibility and physical presence of digital data. In
1997, section 487 was amended to include provisions aimed directly at
the problem of gathering digital “things”. Section 487(2.1) and (2.2)
provide that, in a regular search warrant under section 487, a police
officer or a person at the search location may “use or cause to be used
any computer system at the building or place to search any data
contained in or available to the computer system”. The scope of the
subsection has not been widely considered. It is potentially boundless. If
taking and examining the desktop box was deemed in R. v. Morelli to be
the most intrusive, extensive, and invasive search imaginable,40 what
wiretaps to address constitutional infirmities identified in the Supreme Court decision: Response to
the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in R. v. Tse Act, S.C. 2013, c. 8.
39
Fairburn, supra, note 34, at 79 and 82-83.
40
R. v. Morelli, [2010] S.C.J. No. 8, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253, 2010 SCC 8, at paras. 2-3 and
105 (S.C.C.).
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about a search of all that is “accessible to” that box while its stands
connected in a home or office? Depending on the configurations and
active connections of a given device, there could be data accessible to the
device from other people, other networks, other countries, or other
businesses. The section 487 warrant looks for things in a place, yet the
Court in Vu recognized that “a search of a computer connected to the
Internet or a network gives access to information and documents that are
not in any meaningful sense at the location for which the search is
authorized”.41
Wiretap provisions have also fallen out of step. Part VI of the
Criminal Code governs interception of private communications. Modern
communications are not fixed in time and place in the same fashion as
communications over original telephone wires used to be, making our
traditional understanding of “wiretapping” an uneasy fit with the reality
of police investigations involving private communication. The wire room
is now wireless. Telephone conversation used to disappear when they
were over, so police required the extraordinary power to grab them from
the airspace and record them for eternity. Modern communications do not
fit that mold.42 Communications are far more often recorded in transit,
independent of police involvement and may be stored routinely by
external companies, and sometimes sent in indecipherable code,
encryption, to maintain privacy in transit. Applications and devices are
peddled on the Internet marketplace that boast features designed to
maintain secrecy and destroy all digital trace of our doings.
In 1990, when R. v. Duarte was decided on the issue of recording
communications, La Forest J., writing for the majority, was
concerned with the state taking the transient spoken word and
immortalizing it in exact replica. He wrote that privacy would be
destroyed if the state were free, unfettered, to make surreptitious
permanent electronic recordings of our private communications.43 Preauthorization was required to guard against the “insidious danger” that
the state would “record and transmit our words”. 44 We have come a
41
Vu, supra, note 1, at para. 44. Justice Cromwell, for the Court, later expressly noted that
police executing a traditional warrant to search that did specifically address computer search would
have the benefit of s. 487(2.1) and (2.2) to gather data, though there was no particular discussion of
the ambit or implications of that avenue of search.
42
For discussion of the application of electronic surveillance requirements to telephone and
then digital communications in the United States, see Susan Freiwald, “First Principles of
Communication Privacy”, 2007 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 3, at paras. 13-18.
43
Duarte, supra, note 35, at para. 22.
44
Id., at para. 21.
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significant distance since Duarte. In text-based communications,
standard fare for younger generations, the originator of a communication
is the one creating the permanent record and releasing it to the
uncontrolled cyberspace. The state no longer holds the secret
microphone, but merely accesses that which the sender has packaged in
permanency.45 The Supreme Court has been clear to cut chords with the
past where limits do not make sense in modern technological reality.
Computers are not filing cabinets and phones are not briefcases.
Communications too have changed in character as well as in form.
Privacy will need to be reconsidered in this new context.
The 2013 decision in TELUS is a good example of the difficulty
understanding technology and applying traditional concepts to an
untraditional world. In TELUS, police sought stored text-messages as
well as future, as yet unsent, messages to be delivered on a prospective,
ongoing basis. Although the subject matter of the search was clear, the
future communications of named targets, the Supreme Court was
significantly divided on the proper approach for law enforcement.46
Justice Abella, for three justices, found that Part VI authorization
(a “wiretap”) was required because an intercept occurs whenever the
police acquire the content of a text message from a service provider who
has stored it during the transmission process.47 Justice Moldaver, for two
justices, agreed that Part VI was the right tool but for a different reason.
He declined to define “intercept” but found that courts should approach
the question from a standpoint of substantial equivalence, that is, if what
the police are seeking in substance looks like an intercept, then that is the
appropriate form and standard of pre-authorization.48 The Chief Justice
and Cromwell J. dissented, and commented that the definition of
intercept proposed by Abella J. would undermine well-established law
that said stored communications, already delivered, were accessible by

45
For recent discussion in lower courts on the application of Duarte to text-based
undercover communications, see R. v. Ghorta, “Ruling #1: The Admissibility of Text Messages”
(unreported decision of Durno J., Brampton, Ont. S.C.J., March 16, 2015) and R. v. Graff, [2015]
A.J. No. 717, 2014 ABQB 415, at paras. 51-66 (Alta. Q.B.).
46
The availability of already sent and stored text-messages was not contentious; the parties
agreed that stored text messages were available by production order: TELUS, supra, note 2, at para. 11.
47
TELUS, supra, note 2, at paras. 1-46.
48
Id., at paras. 47-108. Justice Moldaver was influenced by the statutory exclusion of the
use of general warrants where another authorization was available in the Code (s. 487.01(2)(c)) and
by the fact that the statutory preconditions for an intercept were significantly more onerous than the
general warrant.
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search warrant.49 Text communications may have been intercepted by
Telus, but police did not “intercept” when they obtained the already
stored messages. The dissenters would have found that the general
warrant, not an authorization for interception, could properly support the
police request.
TELUS tells us how much we don’t understand about technology.
Law enforcement in the midst of an investigation must determine what
pre-authorization tool is available and should be sought to permit
particular evidence-gathering techniques. Yet even at the highest court in
the country, with years of research and contemplation to assist, the
answer remains uncertain.
TELUS is also an instructive lesson in the power of third party
information holders. The intercept crystallized for three justices, at the
point that the police acquired the messages. But police could only access
that content because Telus, as a business practice, had formed a system
where all messages were copied and temporarily stored. The average
consumer will not likely know the storage practices of her service
provider. If a telecommunications provider’s decisions as to how to store
communications, unbeknownst to clients, could define law enforcement
powers of access, the result would be inconsistent and unprincipled. Yet
modern information storage and communication is heavily dependent on
the facilities and services of private entities. How much power do our
court decisions put in the hands of profit-driven private entities?
2. New Provisions: Bill C-13
In March 2015, new provisions came into effect to update the
Criminal Code search scheme. The new powers include separate
authorizations for transmission data, data preservation schemes, tracking
warrants for things and for people, and several new species of production
order depending on the type of data sought. “Data”, “transmission data”
and “tracking data” are also newly defined.50 It is too soon to say
whether law enforcement will find the new tools meaningful, and
whether courts will find them a sensible matrix for the consideration of
criminal search powers. There are likely to be some growing pains.

49
TELUS, supra, note 2, at paras. 109-196; reference to the inconsistency between the
reasons of Abella J. and prior law on computer search of stored communications at para. 155.
50
Criminal Code, supra, note 34, s. 487.011 [as am. S.C. 2014, c. 31, s. 20].
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IV. CONCLUSION
There is yet no legislative response to recent computer and cellphone
cases in the Supreme Court. While the judgments in Vu and Fearon leave
room for legislated options to address seizure of computers and search of
mobile devices, they do not specifically call out for reform or identify a
pressing need for amendment. In Fearon, the majority indicated that
legislation “may well be desirable” and that there are many ways in
which the law enforcement and privacy concerns may be balanced in the
digital context.51 Parliament has not demonstrated an appetite to enact
particular conditions for computer search. Spencer may yet invoke a
Parliamentary response, though it would be in the realm of a new
power52 not conditions of search.
The Charter leaves room to address the problem of after-the-fact
resolution of legal lines of privacy. Although the Supreme Court has
stated that police should err on the side of caution, usually preauthorization, when faced with grey areas of law, the analysis under
section 24(2) of the Charter permits admissibility of evidence in the
broader interests of justice even where breaches have occurred. Where
the law changes post-search, as opposed to just being unclear, exclusion
of evidence is less likely to result.53
Statutory provisions and legal distinctions should not be technologybased. They will be too fleeting. Tessling’s wisdom should be heeded;
focus on the information obtained by the technique in the case at hand
and deal with advances step by step, as they actually arise.54 Vu and
Fearon offer incremental common law developments that allow for
application of traditional principles but avoid technological distinctions
that would hamper practical application.

51

Fearon, supra, note 4, at para. 84.
A production order is available for Internet subscriber information. A possible change
would be creation of a form of pre-authorization that reflects a lower threshold for police to meet to
access basic subscriber information. At present the general production order can be obtained on a
reasonable belief standard (s. 487.014). Given the low privacy interest in the subscriber data, a
reasonable suspicion standard, which is the standard for transmission data production (s. 487.016),
would likely suffice to pass constitutional muster.
53
See for example Fearon, supra, note 4, at para. 95: “The police simply did something
that they believed on reasonable grounds to be lawful and were proven wrong, after the fact, by
developments in the jurisprudence.” The evidence produced by the search incident to arrest of a cell
phone in Fearon was not excluded, nor was the Internet subscriber data produced without a warrant
in Spencer, supra, note 3, at para. 81.
54
Tessling, supra, note 7, at para. 55.
52
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What’s next? Well, for courts, what is next is what has already
happened. Years ago. The Supreme Court will continue to make small
but important steps to manage our expectations in new technological
fields, while individuals experiment with the newer, faster and farther
reaching capabilities that are years away from courtroom contemplation.
Interception of applications on mobile devices, interjurisdictional debate
over how to erect borders in a landscape of air, authorization for new
techniques such as deliverable programs that install themselves on a
target computer and report back with video, images, microphone and
content recording;55 the next issues are crowding the horizon. Lawyers
and courts will be plodding slowly through the fields, trampling a safe
path, creating case law as road signs to guide us towards that ever-elusive
frontier.

55
See the United States District Court discussion of this technique in the Texas case In re
Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958 F.Supp. 2d 753 (2013).

